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Speeding Up, Down the Hill:  
How the EU shapes corporate tax competition  
in the Single Market 
ABSTRACT 
We show that tax competition in the EU is shaped by four interrelated institutional 
mechanisms: 1) Market integration, by reducing the transaction costs of cross-border 
tax arbitrage in the Single Market, 2) enlargement, by increasing the number and het-
erogeneity of states involved in intra-EU tax competition, 3) tax coordination, by re-
stricting the range of competitive instruments at the disposal of governments, and 
4) supranational judicial review by limiting the scope of  unilateral defences against tax 
competition (judicialization). As a consequence, tax competition is significantly 
stronger in the EU, and the race to the bottom in corporate tax rates more pronounced 
than in the rest of the world.  
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Speeding Up, Down the Hill:  
How the EU shapes corporate tax competition  
in the Single Market  
I. DOES THE EU MAKE A DIFFERENCE?  
The issue of international tax competition has raised a lot of scholarly interest in recent 
years. Given the normative concerns of most policy makers and analysts, the attention 
focused mainly on political and economic consequences: How seriously does tax com-
petition constrain national tax policy autonomy (Adam & Kammas, 2007; Ganghof, 
2006; Garrett, 1998a; Genschel, 2002; Swank & Steinmo, 2002)? How dramatically 
does it threaten the financial basis of the welfare state (Sinn, 1997; Tanzi, 1995)? How 
strongly does it push towards a cross-national convergence of tax policies? (Franzese & 
Hays, 2007; Swank, 2006; Winner, 2005).  
The institutional context of tax competition has received less attention. Even the best 
empirical studies tend to neglect it. Thus, it is quite common in macro-quantitative re-
search not to control for EU membership (e.g. Adam & Kammas, 2007; Ganghof, 2006; 
Garrett, 1998b; Stewart & Webb, 2006; Swank & Steinmo, 2002; Winner, 2005), as-
suming, at least implicitly, that tax competition is essentially similar inside and outside 
the EU. This assumption is wrong. International tax competition, as any form of compe-
tition, is shaped by its institutional setting. Different settings result in different competi-
tive dynamics. Tax competition in the EU varies significantly from tax competition in 
other parts of the world.  
We argue that corporate tax competition in the EU is shaped by four institutional 
mechanisms. The most obvious mechanism is market integration: the EU reduces barri-
ers to cross-border economic transactions in the Single Market and, thus, facilitates in-
ternational tax arbitrage among the tax systems of the member states (integration ef-
fect). The second mechanism is enlargement: by admitting new member states, the EU 
increases the number and heterogeneity of states involved in intra-EU tax competition 
(enlargement effect). The third mechanism is tax coordination: the EU provides a rich 
institutional infrastructure for intergovernmental bargaining and enforcement, which 
helps the member states to devise common rules for tax competition (coordination ef-
fect). The fourth mechanism is supranational tax jurisprudence: the EU submits the uni-
lateral defences that member states have built up to protect national tax claims from 
                                                 
  We would like to thank Lothar Krempel, Christian W. Martin, Thomas Rixen, Achim Schmidt and Susanne Uhl 
for their helpful comments. Many thanks also to Barbara Dooley for language corrections. Financial support by 
the German Research Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged (CRC 597 “Transformations of the State”). 
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international tax arbitrage to judicial review by the European Court of Justice (judiciali-
zation effect).   
The upshot of these four mechanisms is to accelerate tax competition. We will dem-
onstrate that corporate tax competition is significantly more pronounced in the Single 
Market than in the rest of the world. This is interesting news not only to students of the 
comparative political economy of taxation but also to policy makers like French Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy who want to harness the EU as a protective device against the 
ravages of globalization, and to EU scholars. A strong body of recent EU studies  claims 
that competitive races to the bottom are rare in the Single Market (e.g. Majone, 2005: 
152; Moravcsik, 2005: 373; Pelkmans, 2007: 708; Radelli, 2004:4; Schmidt, 2007: 
677). The basic argument is that the EU is a powerful “market maker” and “market 
modifier” (Caporaso & Tarrow, 2007:14) and that, consequently, reregulation rather 
than deregulation is the norm in European integration. Our findings deviate from this 
norm. Corporate taxation provides an exemplar case of a race to the bottom in the Sin-
gle Market.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on tax com-
petition and derives predictions regarding the EU’s institutional effects on corporate tax 
competition. Section 3 presents descriptive evidence that tax competition is stronger in 
the EU than in the rest of the world. Section 4 provides a simple regression analysis 
showing how the EU’s integration and enlargement effects have contributed to the in-
crease of corporate tax competition in the Single Market. Section 5 looks into the coor-
dination effect. It traces efforts by the Commission, the Council and the member states 
to regulate corporate tax competition at the European level and explains why they have 
so far met with only limited success. Section 6 shows how the case law of the ECJ on 
corporate taxation has reinforced rather than restrained tax competition among the 
member states (judicialization effect). Section 7 summarizes our findings and provides 
predictions about the future of European tax competition. 
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF TAX COMPETITION 
In this section, we provide a general framework for understanding the institutional shap-
ing of tax competition. We start by reviewing two basic forms of tax competition, gen-
eral v. targeted, and then discuss four institutional mechanisms that shape the competi-
tive dynamics: integration, enlargement, coordination and judicialization. Finally, we 
derive implications for corporate tax competition in the EU.  
Corporate tax competition can take two major forms (e.g. Keen, 2001): General tax 
competition affects the entire corporate tax base: governments lower taxes for the cor-
porate sector as a whole in order to attract foreign investments and profits and shore up 
domestic ones. Targeted tax competition, by contrast, is limited to selected elements of 
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the corporate tax base: governments offer preferential treatment, so-called preferential 
tax regimes (PTRs), to some, presumably very mobile and tax sensitive, parts of the tax 
base, but keep tax rates up for the rest.  
The distinction between general and targeted tax competition has crucial strategic 
implications. The benchmark model of tax competition (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow & Mi-
eszkowski, 1986) is about general tax rate competition among small states in an anar-
chic setting. In this model perfect capital mobility leads to declining rates of taxation, as 
governments enter a fiscal bidding contest for the internationally mobile tax base. The 
result is a prisoners’ dilemma-type race to the bottom: all states suffer from the compe-
tition and would be better off without it – and since all states are equally small, they 
suffer equally: Tax competition is symmetric. This changes if states differ in size. Bu-
covetsky and others have shown theoretically that small states can gain more from tax 
rate cuts than large states (e.g. Bucovetsky, 1991; Kanbur and Keen, 1993). Since their 
domestic tax base is small compared to the rest of the world, the revenue loss from a 
general rate cut – i.e. revenue forfeited from the domestic base – will be more than 
compensated for by the revenue gain from the inflow of foreign tax base. This is not 
true for large countries, where a cut in the general rate will cause a relatively large reve-
nue loss from the domestic tax base but only a comparatively small inflow of foreign 
base. As a consequence, small states have more to gain from the competition and will 
undercut the rates of large states to attract a disproportionately large share of the inter-
nationally mobile tax base in the competitive equilibrium. The strategic structure is no 
longer symmetric. If differences in country size are large, small states strictly prefer 
competition to non-competition (Dehejia & Genschel, 1999: 411; Holzinger, 2005:493; 
Zodrow, 2003: 655-656). 
We assume that country size is less important in targeted tax competition because the 
spillover effect into domestic tax policy is less pronounced: PTRs mitigate the policy 
dilemma of large states (or small high-tax states) between external competitiveness and 
domestic revenue; governments can retaliate against “aggressive” foreign competition at 
less fiscal cost than under general tax competition. Targeted tax competition may still 
be collectively harmful, and, thus, resemble a Prisoners’ Dilemma, but the Dilemma is 
more symmetric: all states, large and small, suffer from the competition and would be 
better off without it.  
In a completely institution-free setting, it would be up to national governments to de-
cide whether to open up to international tax competition at all, and if so, in what mode 
and how aggressively to compete. An institutionalized setting, by contrast, constrains 
these choices in at least four ways.  
First, the institutional setting affects the transaction costs of international tax arbi-
trage. Private firms will engage in cross-border factor or profit shifting only if the gains 
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in terms of lower foreign taxation outweigh the costs in terms of dealing with capital 
and investment restrictions, exchange rate volatility or political hold-up risks.1 Any re-
duction in transaction costs will increase tax arbitrage, all else being equal. This is why 
institutional settings which reduce the scope of capital controls, exchange rate fluctua-
tions or political hold-up risks, i.e. settings which further market integration, will in-
crease tax competition. We call this the integration effect.    
Second, the institutional setting determines the number and heterogeneity of states 
which compete at the institutionally-defined level of market integration. An increase in 
the number of states tends to boost tax competition because, intuitively, it reduces the 
relative size of each state, and, thus, amplifies the incentive to cut taxes (see Hoyt, 1991 
for a rigorous treatment). Heterogeneity matters because, as argued above, governments 
are more likely to engage in aggressive tax competition if states differ in size than if 
they are of about equal size. Also differences in affluence are likely to increase tax 
competition because poor peripheral states are more likely to use tax instruments to at-
tract business investments and profits than rich core states (Franzese & Hays, 2007). 
This is why institutional settings which increase the number and heterogeneity (in terms 
of size and affluence) of competing states are likely to strengthen tax competition. We 
call this the enlargement effect.  
Third, the institutional setting affects the transactions costs of intergovernmental tax 
coordination. In principle, governments can curb tax competition collectively by har-
monizing tax rates and/ or devising common restrictions on PTRs. In practise, this re-
quires the solution of various bargaining and enforcement problems. To the extent that 
the institutional context facilitates the solution of these problems (just see Koremenos, 
Lipson, & Snidal, 2001), it tends to mitigate the force of (some forms of) tax competi-
tion. We call this the coordination effect.  
Finally, the institutional setting determines the scope of unilateral defences against 
tax competition. Governments can reduce their vulnerability to international tax arbi-
trage unilaterally by devising so-called anti tax avoidance rules. These rules impose 
extra tax or administrative costs on cross-border activities which are typically used for 
base shifting purposes.2 Of course, there is a high potential for conflict with internation-
ally mandated rules of openness and market integration. Therefore, the scope of national 
anti avoidance legislation depends very much on who adjudicates conflicts between 
national and international rules. If this task is delegated to supranational courts, the 
                                                 
1  Foreign investment involves a hold-up risk to the extent that it is vulnerable to expropriation by the host country 
government.  
2  For a short list of standard anti avoidance measures see e.g. Kiekebeld (2004: 92-95). 
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scope will be more limited than if it is taken on in intergovernmental negotiations. This 
we call the judicialization effect.  
What are the consequences for tax competition in the EU? Our theoretic discussion 
has ambiguous implications. The first is that we would expect more tax competition 
within the EU. The level of market integration is high. The tax and regulatory barriers to 
cross-border activities of multinational corporations are low3, and so are the monetary 
and political risks involved (integration effect). On top of that, the most recent round of 
enlargement has markedly increased the size and heterogeneity of the EU membership 
(enlargement effect), and the adjudication of norm conflicts between national and Euro-
pean laws is firmly entrusted to the ECJ, the European Court of Justice (judicialization 
effect). The second implication is that we would expect less tax competition than in the 
rest of world. The EU has sophisticated institutional machinery for bargaining and en-
forcement. This should greatly increase the probability of successful tax coordination 
(coordination effect). Also, while the delegation of legal adjudication to the ECJ may 
restrict the scope of unilateral defences against tax competition, empirical investigations 
into the ECJ’s non-tax jurisprudence suggest that it is unlikely to prohibit them com-
pletely. In several instances, the Court has allowed national restrictions of European 
market freedoms to stand because they appeared reasonable and proportionate in light of 
imperative requirements of public interest. Some observers claim, therefore, that the 
role of the ECJ is not only, and maybe not even most importantly, to further market in-
tegration but to provide legal templates for the political re-embedding of the integrated 
market (e.g. Caporaso & Tarrow, 2007; Stone Sweet, 2004: 134).  
III. HOW STRONG IS TAX COMPETITION IN THE EU?  
In this section we analyse descriptive evidence on the strength of tax competition in the 
EU. We look at two indicators: statutory tax rates and preferential tax regimes. We find 
systematic evidence that statutory tax rates have fallen faster since the 1990s, and 
reached lower levels in the EU than in the rest of the world. We also find anecdotal evi-
dence that the incidence of preferential tax regimes is particularly high in the EU. Both 
findings suggest that tax competition is stronger in the Single Market than elsewhere. 
Under conditions of general corporate tax competition we should observe a decline 
in corporate tax rates. If competition is stronger in the EU than elsewhere, this decline 
should also be stronger. To test this hypothesis, we focus on the statutory tax rate be-
cause it is the single most important determinant of the effective corporate tax burden 
(e.g. European Commission, 2001:6) and a key factor for corporate tax planning and 
                                                 
3  See especially EC Treaty article 43 (freedom of establishment), article 56 (free movement of capital), and article 
49 (freedom to provide services). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 78) 
- 6 - 
arbitrage (e.g. Devereux, Griffith, & Klemm, 2002). We limit our investigation to the 
time period between 1997 and 2006 because this gives us a maximum number of coun-
tries to observe. While general tax competition already emerged in the late 1980s (e.g. 
Ganghof, 2006; Swank, 2006), tax rate information for non-OECD states is too sketchy 
before 1997 to allow for a systematic comparison. Since Eastern Enlargement has 
changed the membership of the EU dramatically between 1997 and 2006, we sort the 61 
countries in our data set4 into three different groups: old EU member states (EU-15), 
new member states (Accession-12) and the rest of the world (RoW-34).5 
Figure 1: The Development of Corporate Tax Rates, 1997-2006 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
C
or
po
ra
te
 T
ax
 R
at
e
EU-15
Accession countries
Rest of the world
 
Source: KPMG (1998, 2006), European Commission (2007), own calculation 
                                                 
4  The data set combines data from the European Union (European Commission Directorate-General Taxation and 
Customs Union, 2007) and the KPMG corporate tax survey (KPMG, 1998, 2006). Both data sets are highly corre-
lated in 1997 (r = 98.98) and 2006 (r = 99.91) once obvious typing errors (data for Luxembourg and the Czech 
Republic in KPMG 1997) have been replaced by data from the 1998 of the KPMG survey. 
5  The rest of the world includes Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzer-
land, Thailand, Turkey, United States, and Vietnam. The accession countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Finally, the 
well-known EU Countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Note that our sample does not in-
clude pure tax havens such as the Cayman Islands or the Bahamas.  
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Figure 1 compares the development of statutory corporate tax rates in the three country 
groups. It clearly shows a universal decline: statutory rates have fallen in all three coun-
try groups. However, the decline is much more pronounced among old and new member 
states than in the rest of the world.  
Under conditions of targeted tax competition we should observe an increase in the 
incidence of PTRs. If targeted competition is more pronounced in the EU than else-
where, this incidence should also be more pronounced. Unfortunately, this proposition 
cannot be rigorously tested because PTRs are inherently difficult to quantify, and com-
parative data is scarce, especially for the ‘rest of the world’. Yet there is ample anecdo-
tal evidence that PTRs have become more widespread since the 1980s, and that EU 
member states have been frequent users of PTRs. 
As to the rising trend in PTR, we note that some preferential regimes are fairly old. 
Luxembourg’s special holding regime, for instance, dates from the late 1920s, the Dutch 
‘cost-plus’ regime for multinational companies from the 1950s, and the Irish Export 
Sales Relief (ESR) for corporate profits from export and its tax breaks for the ‘Shannon 
Free Airport Zone’ also originated in that decade. However, with rising capital mobility, 
PTRs became much more popular in the 1980s and 1990s. The ‘first movers’ in the tar-
geted tax competition game extended and refined their PTRs, while the ‘latecomers’ 
jumped on the PTR bandwagon. Ireland, for instance, replaced the ESR and the Shan-
non relief by a special reduced corporate tax rate of only 10 percent applicable to manu-
facturing activities in Ireland and to financial services provided in the Dublin Docks 
(Cunningham, 1995: 394-395). Belgium and Luxembourg set up preferential regimes 
for so-called ‘Coordination, Distribution and Services Centres’ in reaction to similar 
incentive schemes in the Netherlands (McKenzie, 1999: 317). Large countries re-
sponded by setting up their own regimes, for example, Germany (Monitoring and Coor-
dination Offices), Spain (Basque Country and Navarra Coordination centres), Britain 
(Shipping), France (headquarter services) and Italy (Trieste off-shore financial and in-
surance services centre ).  
While PTRs are not uncommon outside the EU, they are particularly widespread in 
the EU. When the OECD monitored the prevalence of such regimes in its 30 member 
states in 2006, the EU-15 alone accounted for 55 of the 70 regimes on the list (OECD, 
2006).6 
                                                 
6  The list included 47 “potentially harmful regimes identified in 2000”, 14 “Holding Company Regimes and Simi-
lar Preferential Regimes” and 9 “preferential tax regimes introduced after 2000” (OECD, 2006:5-6).  
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IV. HOW INTEGRATION AND ENLARGEMENT HAVE BOOSTED TAX 
COMPETITION IN THE SINGLE MARKET  
Tax competition is only one reason why governments may want lower corporate taxa-
tion.  But how do we know that it was competitive pressure and not, for example, “the 
spread of Neoliberalism” (Swank, 2006) that pushed corporate taxes down in the EU? 
To resolve this question, we focus on a simple indicator: country size. As explained 
above, the benchmark model of tax competition suggests that small states face stronger 
competitive incentives to cut tax rates than large states and, therefore, have lower rates 
in equilibrium. In line with this theoretical result, several empirical studies find a strong 
and comparatively robust correlation between country size and the level of corporate tax 
rates for different country samples: small states do indeed tend to have lower corporate 
tax rates than large states (Slemrod, 2004; Weichenrieder, 2005). Ganghof tracks this 
correlation over time and finds it to have grown substantially since the late 1980s in a 
sample of 21 OECD countries (Ganghof, 2006: 140). This suggests that tax competition 
has indeed been a major contributing factor in the universal decline of corporate tax 
rates.  
Did tax competition also cause tax rates in EU states to decline faster than in the rest 
of the world? We compare the relationship between corporate tax rates and country size 
across the three country groups at two points in time (1997 and 2006). If the pressure is 
indeed higher inside the EU, the effect of country size on corporate tax rates should be 
stronger (and statistically more significant). This comparison is made more difficult by 
the recent round of accessions. While tax competition was largely restricted to the EU-
15 states until the late 1990s, it increasingly extended to the Accession-12 afterwards. 
We therefore need to distinguish between two intersecting competitive effects in the 
EU, namely within-group competition among the EU-15 states (integration effect) and 
between-group competition between EU-15 and Accession-12 states (enlargement ef-
fect).7 If within-group competition among the EU-15 states is stronger than in the Rest 
of the World, we would expect the tax rates of EU-15 states to display a greater sensi-
tivity to country size than those of other states, i.e. similar changes in size should result 
in stronger changes of the rate. If competition between the EU-15 and the Accession-12 
group is stronger than between the EU-15 and the rest of world we would expect the 
Accession states to have lower corporate tax rates compared with other states of similar 
size.  
                                                 
7  Of course, there is also within-group competition among the Accession-12 states. However, it is likely to be weak 
as compared to between-group competition with the EU-15. After all, Hungary and Slovakia compete not so 
much for each other’s mobile capital but for mobile capital from Germany, Austria and other EU-15 states.  
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To test these predictions we perform two cross-sectional regressions each for 1997 
and 2006. 8 The regressions relate statutory corporate tax rates to country size and to 
EU-15 and Accession-12 membership. We use the same tax rate data as in figure 1 
above. In accordance with the literature, we measure ‘country size’ as the natural log of 
the population. In order to capture the integration effect, we construct a dummy for 
‘EU-15’ membership and interact it with country size (EU-15 x Country Size). In order 
to test for the enlargement effect, we construct an ‘Accession-12’ dummy. This dummy 
allows us to check whether corporate tax rates are indeed lower in Accession states than 
in the rest of the world. In addition, we enter ‘affluence’ (i.e. the natural log of GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parities) as a control variable that summarizes a variety of 
domestic influences on the corporate tax rate. Tests of heteroscedasticity led us to use 
robust standard errors.  
Table 1: The determinants of corporate tax rates, 1997 and 2006 
 Dependent variable: corporate tax rate 
 1997 2006 
Independent variables  A B A B 
Country Size  1.29** (.59) 
1.37** 
(.61) 
1.17** 
(.55) 
1.51*** 
(.44) 
EU-15  4.58 (2.78) 
3.99 
(2.61) 
-.08 
(2.06) 
-.63 
(1.93) 
EU-15 x Country Size  1.17 (1.94) 
3.29 
(2.27) 
1.52 
(1.52) 
3.37** 
(1.40) 
Accesssion-12  .60 (2.54) 
.26 
(2.59) 
-8.36*** 
(2.13) 
-9.38*** 
(1.80) 
Affluence  1.38 (1.29) 
1.18 
(1.29) 
.56 
(.95) 
.45 
(.91) 
Intercept 32.68*** (1.29) 
32.57*** 
(1.30) 
29.65*** 
(1.11) 
29.42*** 
(1.04) 
R2 0.21 0.26 0.46 0.62 
Prob > F 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 
N 61 59 61 59 
Removed outliers -- LUX, MLT -- LUX, MLT 
Sources: cf. footnote no. 4. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Country size and affluence are both cantered. 
How do the results (table 1) fit our theoretical expectations? With regard to country 
size, they confirm earlier findings: in all four models, corporate tax rates are positively 
and significantly related to country size. The evidence of this relationship is still weak 
in 1997. Auxiliary regressions excluding the interaction term show that in 2006 the rela-
tionship is slightly stronger and its significance considerably higher. We conclude that 
                                                 
8  The data set and a STATA 10 „do-file“ can be obtained from the authors. 
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tax competition is a global phenomenon and has become more pronounced since the 
1990s.  
The results also confirm the integration effect. The evidence is less straightforward, 
however, because the interaction term (EU-15 x country size) is distorted by outliers. A 
comparison of models a and b for the two years of observation shows that Luxembourg 
and Malta strongly influence the significance of the interaction term and the overall 
model fit (adjusted R2 and F-Test). If we remove these two countries, the interaction 
term is positive and significant in 2006.9  
The two outliers confirm the significance of targeted tax competition in the Single 
Market.  With a population of less than .5 million people, Malta and Luxembourg have 
high statutory tax rates on a par with large countries such as Germany and Britain. This 
is not because they do not engage in tax competition but because they compete almost 
exclusively on PTRs. Small countries are free to compete on regimes or rates. If they 
opt for the former, their general tax rate will overshoot the level compatible with gen-
eral tax competition (McKenzie, 1999). This is why our two most disturbing outliers are 
small states and why we have to exclude them in order to control for the effect of tar-
geted tax competition on general rates.  
Model b (2006) indicates that the sensitivity of the corporate tax rate to changes in 
country size is indeed stronger in the EU-15 than in the rest of the world: every time 
population size doubles, the average corporate tax rate in the rest of the world increases 
by about 1.5 percentage points, while in the EU-15 it climbs by almost five (1.5 + 3.4) 
percentage points. Note that the interaction term between country size and EU-15 mem-
bership is not significant for 1997: competitive pressures were not visibly stronger in 
the EU-15 than in the rest of the world in that year. We think this is no coincidence, 
given that since that year the EU became both more integrated (Monetary Union) and 
significantly larger (Eastern Enlargement). This interpretation is in line with the 
enlargement effect. In the regressions for the year 1997, the Accession-12 states cannot 
statistically be distinguished from the rest of the world. Ten years later, however, their 
corporate tax rates are far below what could be expected from their country size. Ac-
cording to model b (2006), they undercut the rates of other states of similar size by al-
most 9.5 percentage points. This highlights how strongly the enlargement process has 
increased the competitive incentive for the Accession countries.  
In sum, our analysis demonstrates that it was the higher intensity of general tax com-
petition that caused corporate tax rates in EU-15 and Accession-12 states to fall more 
quickly than in the rest of the world. In the case of the EU-15 states, this was mainly 
                                                 
9 We looked at partial plots and found that Luxembourg and Malta are clearly the most disturbing outliers. Remov-
ing another outlier, viz. Ireland, does not alter the results in any meaningful way. 
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due to the high level of within-group competition caused by European market integra-
tion. In the case of the Accession states it was mainly due to the high level of between-
group competition with the EU-15 caused by enlargement. Our analysis also elucidates 
the interaction between general and targeted tax competition. For small countries, both 
forms of competition are close substitutes. Controlling for the PTR-based competitive 
strategies of Malta and Luxembourg therefore strengthens our findings about general 
tax competition.  
V. LIMITED SUCCESS IN EU CORPORATE TAX COORDINATION  
In the previous sections, we have shown that tax competition is stronger in the EU than 
in the rest of the world. In this section we analyse corporate tax coordination. We show 
that it is more advanced in the EU than in the rest of the world but still quite limited.  
At the global level, corporate tax coordination is minimal and inconspicuous. There 
is a dense network of bilateral tax treaties to reduce tax barriers for cross-border eco-
nomic activities, and there is the OECD “project on harmful tax practises” to stop inter-
national tax base “poaching”. Launched in 1998, this project has suffered from serious 
disagreements among the member states, and seen its scope substantially reduced. The 
issue of corporate tax arbitrage is no longer covered (Rixen, 2008; Webb, 2004). At the 
EU level, by contrast, the issue of corporate tax coordination has been on the policy 
agenda since the 1960s with some partial success. While the member states have taken 
some steps to curb targeted (PTR) tax competition collectively, they have taken no ac-
tion, to date, to contain general tax competition.  
Already in 1960s, the Commission called for a harmonization of corporate tax sys-
tems, bases and rates in order to improve market integration and prevent tax competi-
tion (European Commission, 1967). However, the Council showed little interest and 
almost completely ignored the Commission’s proposals. The Single Market program 
greatly increased the salience of corporate tax coordination in the 1990s. More coordi-
nation appeared to be needed in order to eliminate corporate tax obstacles that hindered 
the completion of the Single Market. With this purpose in mind, the Council adopted its 
first directives ever in the corporate tax field, the ‘parent-subsidiary’ and the ‘merger’ 
directive in 1990, and the ‘interest and royalties’ directive in 2003.10 More recently, the 
Commission started to campaign for the introduction of a Common Consolidated Cor-
porate Tax Base as a comprehensive solution to removing all remaining corporate tax 
                                                 
10  Two further directives amending the parent-subsidiary and the merger directive were passed in 2003 and 2005.   
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obstacles (Radaelli & Kraemer, 2008).11 Many policy makers and tax experts felt that 
more corporate tax coordination was also required to curb corporate tax competition. In 
1992, an expert report warned of a surge in general and especially in targeted tax com-
petition in the Single Market, and presented a detailed list of countermeasures, includ-
ing the introduction of a harmonized minimum corporate tax rate and of common re-
strictions on the use of PTRs (Ruding Report, 1992: 209-219). In 1996, tax Commis-
sioner Mario Monti repeated both proposals in a memorandum on “Taxation in the 
European Union”. Failure to take coordinated action on tax competition, he warned, 
would frustrate national efforts to boost employment and meet the ‘Maastricht criteria’ 
for Monetary Union (European Commission, 1996),   
The ‘Monti Memorandum’ triggered an intense intergovernmental debate on corpo-
rate tax coordination. The debate quickly focused on the problem of targeted tax compe-
tition and set aside the issue of falling general tax rates. This narrowing of focus facili-
tated agreement for two reasons. First, the strategic structure of targeted tax competition 
is more symmetric than that of general tax rate competition, and, hence tax coordination 
to stop it less prone to distributive conflict (see section I above). Second, limiting tax 
coordination to PTRs offered something to everybody: it assured the self-perceived los-
ers of corporate tax competition, such as France and Germany, that something was done 
against excessive competition while, at the same time, reassuring the champions of tax 
competition, such as Ireland, that the competition would go on, if only by restricted 
means. 
In December 1997, the member states agreed on a soft law code of conduct for busi-
ness taxation containing a non-binding political commitment to abandon (“rollback”) 
“harmful” PTRs, and to refrain from introducing new ones (“standstill”) (Cattoir, 2006). 
A group of high-ranking national officials (Code of Conduct or “Primarolo” Group) was 
assigned the task of reviewing existing tax incentive schemes in light of the Code’s cri-
teria of harmfulness. In November 1999, the group presented its final report, containing 
a blacklist of 66 harmful PTRs in the EU-15 states and their dependent territories 
(“Primarolo Report”). With the exception of Sweden, each member state was repre-
sented by at least one entry on the list. This highlighted the symmetry of the underlying 
cooperation problem. The Council formally adopted the list in 2003, and decided to 
make compliance with the principles of the code a condition for EU membership. What 
was soft law to the old EU-15 states became hard law for the accession states. The 
                                                 
11  The common consolidated corporate tax base combines three elements: a) a common definition of the tax base, b) 
group consolidation, and c) a common sharing rule for tax base allocating among the member states (formula ap-
portionment).  
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European Commission screened their corporate tax codes for PTRs and identified 30 
harmful regimes, which had to be abolished before accession.   
Even for the EU-15 states, the Code of Conduct was not entirely soft law because it 
contained a self-commitment by the Commission to apply strictly the state aid rules 
(articles 87-89 EC Treaty) to PTRs. Shadowing the work of the Primarolo Group, the 
Commission re-examined all existing PTRs, and, in 2001, opened official investigations 
into 15 tax regimes on the Primarolo blacklist (Radaelli & Kraemer, 2008: 327). This 
sent a clear signal to the member states that the Code of Conduct operated in the 
“shadow of competition law”, and, arguably, increased incentives for voluntary compli-
ance.  
Some member states, including Malta and Luxembourg complied by “amending” 
their PTRs so as to circumvent the Code’s formal criteria of harmfulness. Others abol-
ished “harmful” PTRs completely but, at the same time, slashed their general tax rates. 
The most prominent example is Ireland, which cut its standard corporate tax rate to 12.5 
percent in return for abolishing its special 10 percent rate regime. Hence, to the extent 
that the Code is effective in constraining targeted tax competition, it tends to fuel gen-
eral tax rate competition (Keen, 2001).  
In 2004, Germany and France launched a new bid for a common minimum corporate 
tax rate to mitigate general tax competition (Ganghof & Genschel, 2008: 58). However, 
the prospects of reaching an agreement were even less auspicious than in the 1990s. The 
integration effect of Monetary Union and an arbitrage-friendly tax jurisprudence of the 
ECJ (see below) had deepened the structural conflict between large losers and small 
winners of tax competition, while the enlargement effect of the Eastern accession had 
greatly increased the number of winners: Germany and France were no longer up 
against the resistance of Ireland alone but also that of Estonia, Slovakia and other new 
member states, intent on copying Ireland’s low corporate tax strategy. The Commission 
also refused to support the Franco-German initiative (Kovács, 2004), partly out of fear 
that it could derail its priority project, the common consolidated corporate tax base.  
Many observers attribute the limited success of corporate tax coordination to the per-
sistence of the unanimity rule in tax matters (e.g. McLure, 2007: 124; Radaelli, 1995: 
160; Ruding Report, 1992: 45). However, this explanation is not entirely convincing,  
because the unanimity requirement makes agreement difficult but by no means impossi-
ble, as the long list of harmonization measures in indirect taxation clearly indicates 
(Terra & Wattel, 2005: ch.6 and 7). Also, more fundamentally, decision rules are en-
dogenous to the underlying cooperation problem and, hence, have to be treated as part 
of the explanandum (Genschel, Rixen, & Uhl, 2007: 752-753). It is not by coincidence 
that Germany and France campaigned for the introduction of qualified majority voting 
in tax matters during the negotiations on the European Constitution, while Ireland and 
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Estonia were among the most outspoken critics of this proposal  (see Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 2005: 55; Fischer & Villepin, 2002: 4; Parts, 2003: 4).  
In conclusion, in marked contrast to the rest of the world, there have been sustained 
efforts to curb collectively corporate tax competition in the EU. However, these efforts 
met with only limited success. While the member states managed to agree on a Code of 
Conduct to limit (some forms of) targeted tax competition, they failed at tax rate har-
monization. In fact, to the extent that the Code is effective in curbing targeted tax com-
petition, it may, indirectly, fuel general tax competition and thus further aggravate dis-
tributive conflicts over tax rate harmonization.  
VI. THE CORPORATE TAX JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE  
If attempts to curb corporate tax competition collectively have met only limited success, 
why don’t member states recur to anti tax avoidance legislation?  Actually they do, but 
are increasingly constrained by the case law of the ECJ.  
Outside the EU, national anti tax avoidance legislation is not subject to any suprana-
tional judicial review. While most bilateral tax treaties contain a so-called mutual 
agreement procedure to resolve conflicts of treaty interpretation, this procedure is dip-
lomatic rather than judicial in nature. Judicialization is low. With respect to the com-
patibility of national anti avoidance measures and international tax treaty law, national 
governments have the last word (Rixen, 2008).  
Table 2: The corporate tax jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
Year Cases of which:  
  Preliminary rulings “lost” by Member State 
1958-1992 1 0 1 
1993-1997 5 5 4 
1998-2002 17 16 14 
2003-2007 20 19 12 
 1958-2007 43 40 31 
Source: Eur-Lex, own calculations 
Notes:  cases refer to judgements of the ECJ dealing with corporate tax issues. Judgements on state aid/ competition 
policy are excluded even where they involve corporation taxation. Orders are also excluded. In the case of prelimi-
nary rulings, actions are coded as “lost” if the operative part of the judgement contains a statement to the effect that 
the relevant provisions of EU law “are to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as the tax 
legislation in question in the main proceedings”. If by contrast, the Court rules that the national legislation are “not 
precluded” by EU law either in part or in total, the case is coded as “not lost”.  
In the EU, by contrast, all national tax legislation is subject to judicial review by the 
ECJ. Starting in 1986, the ECJ has developed a significant body of case law in the cor-
porate tax field. Table 2 shows some pertinent features of this development. First, the 
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number of cases is still low but has been increasing regularly. The case load quadrupled 
from only 5 cases in the time period 1993-1997 to 20 cases between 2003 and 2007.  
Second, almost 95 percent of all corporate tax cases (40 out of a total of 43) have 
reached the Court by way of the preliminary reference procedure: they start with a 
claim, brought forward by a taxpayer in a national court, that a particular national cor-
porate tax provision is inconsistent with EU law. The national court refers the case to 
the ECJ for an authoritative judgement of the relevant provisions of EU law. On the 
basis of this judgement, the national court finally decides the case. Since taxpayers are 
willing to incur the costs of litigation only when they hope that success will lower their 
tax burden, the cases that reach the ECJ usually concern national tax laws which are 
costly to taxpayers but essential to tax authorities, such as, notably, anti tax avoidance 
provisions. Hence, the prevalence of the preliminary rulings procedure implies an inher-
ent tax reduction bias of the cases brought. The best outcome a member state can reach 
in these cases is to defend the tax policy status quo (Graetz & Warren, 2007: 293)  
Third, the member states rarely obtain the best possible outcome. Between 1986 and 
2003, they “lost” more than 80 percent of the corporate tax cases before the ECJ (19 out 
of 23). While their chances of success have recently improved (12 cases lost out of 20 
between 2003 and 2007), the odds against victory are still considerable.  Frequently, the 
Court  regards incriminated national tax rules  as submitting cross-border transactions to 
less favourable tax treatment (in terms of tax burden and/or compliance costs) than es-
sentially similar domestic transactions, and, consequently, rules them to be inconsistent 
with the “four freedoms” of the EC Treaty (free movement of goods, services, persons 
and capital).   
To be sure, not all national laws of a restrictive nature automatically violate the 
Treaty. In its non-tax case law the Court has repeatedly allowed (non-discriminatory) 
restrictions to the free movement of goods and services to stand because (a) they serve 
imperative requirements of public interest and (b) are proportionate to the objective pur-
sued (i.e. protect the public interest in the least restrictive way) (e.g. Nicolaidis & 
Schmidt, 2007; Pelkmans, 2007; Stone Sweet, 2004: ch.3). In its corporate tax case law, 
by contrast, the Court has been extremely reluctant to accept justifications for restrictive 
national provisions (Aujean, 2007; Terra & Wattel, 2005: ch.2). Perhaps most impor-
tantly, it has consistently refused to accept revenue requirements as an imperative re-
quirement of the public interest: it does not allow member states to uphold restrictive 
tax laws simply because removing them would result in a loss of revenue. If corpora-
tions exploit the lower level of taxation in another member state, this is, according to the 
Court, not an abuse to be stopped but a legitimate right to be protected in the Single 
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Market (Terra & Wattel, 2005: 146)12. Only “purely artificial” arrangements are consid-
ered abusive by the Court: letterbox companies do not enjoy Treaty protection. How-
ever, even in these cases the Court has been very reluctant to accept the need for effi-
cient fiscal supervision as a justification for restrictive national tax rules. It has usually 
taken the view that mutual administrative assistance among the member states can guar-
antee the same outcome in a less restrictive way, and, therefore, struck down national 
anti avoidance rules for lack of proportionality.13  
The ECJ corporate tax jurisprudence restricts the freedom of the member states to 
rely on national anti tax avoidance rules for protection from international tax competi-
tion. By providing guidelines for what is or is not lawful corporate tax policy, the juris-
prudence also has an indirect harmonization effect (see Stone Sweet, 2004: 134). The 
Commission tries to steer and enhance this harmonization effect by issuing interpretive 
communications on specific Court rulings (e.g. European Commission, 2007a). The key 
message is usually that the member states have to tear down the protective walls they 
built around their domestic tax claims in the past either unilaterally or, preferably, by 
supporting the Commission’s initiative for a common consolidated corporate tax base. 
The communications are non-binding but serve as common reference points for national 
governments, potential litigants and also the ECJ, and, thus, synchronize perceptions 
and decisions. 
In conclusion, the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence has restricted the scope of national anti 
tax avoidance legislation and, thus, indirectly fuelled corporate tax competition in the 
Single Market. By forcing the member states to grant equal treatment to essentially 
similar domestic and cross-border corporate activities, it has come close to giving cor-
porations “an option where to be taxed” (Lang, 2007: 53). Recent judgements have been 
less strict, allowing some restrictive tax rules to stand and acknowledging, at least im-
plicitly, that national tax systems may not only be something to be  pried open but also 
as something to be protected.14  It is still too early to say, however, whether this indi-
cates a fundamental change of the ECJ’s corporate tax jurisprudence.  
VII. THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN TAX COMPETITION 
In this paper, we have shown that corporate tax competition in the EU is shaped by four 
interrelated effects. The integration effect of one market (Single Market program), one 
currency (monetary unification) and one law (acquis communautaire) reduces the trans-
                                                 
12  See e.g. the Eurowings case (C-294/97) concerning German anti avoidance measures applied to a company mak-
ing use of the Irish ‚Shannon Free Airport Zone’.  
13  However, see the recent Kofoed case (C-321/05) 2007. 
14  See e.g. the cases Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) 2005, Oy AA (C-241/05) 2007, or Lidl Belgium (C-414/06) 2008. 
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action costs of cross-border tax arbitrage in the Single Market. The enlargement effect 
of the recent accession of Eastern countries greatly enhances the heterogeneity of the 
EU membership in terms of country size and affluence, and thus increases the competi-
tive constraints on governments. The coordination effect of the code of conduct for 
business taxation restricts the scope of targeted tax competition, and diverts competitive 
pressures to general tax rates. The judicialization effect of the ECJ’s corporate tax juris-
prudence limits the ability of national governments to fight tax competition unilaterally 
by national anti tax avoidance legislation. All four effects combined have given corpo-
rate tax competition a boost since the 1990s. We presented systematic evidence that 
general tax rate competition is significantly stronger in the Single Market than in other 
parts of the world. We also offered anecdotal evidence that intra-EU targeted tax com-
petition is stronger (or at least has been stronger until recently) than extra-EU competi-
tion.  
What is the future of tax competition in the EU? The answer depends very much on 
the further development of the four above-mentioned institutional effects. We offer the 
following predictions.  
The integration effect is unlikely to relax very much. The Single Market and the ac-
quis communautaire are shared by all 27 member states, while other important policy 
areas (money, defence, justice and home affairs) follow, de jure or de facto, the logic of 
differentiated integration. Therefore, any backtracking on market integration and legal 
integration would immediately raise the question what else could keep an increasingly 
diverse Community together.  
The enlargement effect also seems unlikely to relax. Eastern Enlargement was the 
EU’s only major success in recent years. It is unpopular in some old member states but 
the foreign policy rationale for further enlargement is strong (e.g. The Economist, 
2008). Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey already enjoy candidate status while Albania, 
Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo are considered as potential candidates. All of 
these countries are poor compared with the EU average and most of them are very 
small. Once admitted to the club, the incentive for them to engage in aggressive tax 
competition would be very high.  
The coordination effect is difficult to predict. There is concern that the effectiveness 
of the Code of Conduct could be undermined by the avoidance strategies of member 
states, which adapt their PTRs to the letter but not the spirit of the Code. However, there 
is also talk about the possible widening of the scope of the Code. This could potentially 
increase its effectiveness (Cattoir, 2006: 14.). More importantly, the Commission’s pro-
ject to establish a common consolidated corporate tax base has the potential to bring 
about a fundamental transformation of tax competition in the Single Market. Many ex-
perts argue that its adoption would not reduce and could quite possibly increase com-
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petitive pressure on the statutory tax rate, partly because the statutory rate would be the 
one remaining policy variable in an otherwise comprehensively harmonized corporate 
tax system (e.g. Sørensen, 2004). However, precisely because it is so tightly linked to 
the tax rate, it could also make tax rate harmonization more likely. While the Commis-
sion denies it (e.g. European Commission, 2007b: 6, 8), some observers view the com-
mon consolidated corporate tax base as just a “stalking horse”  for achieving tax rate 
harmonization (Graetz & Warren, 2007: 298). Many small member states including 
Ireland, Malta, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus and Estonia have raised objections 
to the project (Weiner, 2007). To pre-empt their opposition, the Commission has pro-
posed that the common consolidated base could be adopted by a coalition of the willing 
rather than the entire membership (“enhanced cooperation”). This would create two 
areas in the Single Market, in which corporate tax competition follows different institu-
tional rules.   
The judicialization effect is equally difficult to gauge. A lot depends on whether the 
recent (moderate) softening of the ECJ’s corporate tax jurisprudence marks just a tem-
porary aberration from its earlier more activist case law or a permanent change towards 
more judicial self-restraint. The temporal coincidence with Eastern Enlargement may be 
purely accidental. However, it could also signal an implicit acknowledgement that a 
heterogeneous Community of 27+ member states cannot be held to the same standards 
of negative integration, i.e. tax competition, or positive integration, i.e. tax harmoniza-
tion, as the much more homogenous EU-15 group.  
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